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American constitutional theory never has recovered from Justice
Holmes' famous dissent in Lochner v. New York: "The Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."' While in retro-
spect it seems obvious that the fourteenth amendment is not a social
Darwinist tract, it is less easy to determine what substantive content, if any,
the clause does contain. If no core content exists, the Holmesian argument
goes, "activist" judicial vetoing of the "democratic" results of the major-
itarian process is illegitimate. Defenders of the activist decisions of the
Warren Court always have found the Holmesian argument an embarrassment
since it undercuts the Supreme Court's work in support of human rights.2
Thousands of pages have been written in hope of furnishing a rejoinder, none
with complete success.
Michael Perry's new book3 makes an eloquent response to Holmes that,
to be fully appreciated, must be placed in the framework of the three intellec-
tual positions currently at war with each other in the law reviews over the
legitimacy of judicial review. I will call them the "conservative liberal," the
"progressive liberal,", 4 and the "critical" positions.
The conservative liberal position, associated with Robert Bork and
William Rehnquist, accepts the Holmesian argument at face value. The
Supreme Court is empowered only to interpret the Constitution;6 this means
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B. 1968, Georgetown University; J.D. 1973, Columbia
University.
** Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. B.S. 1964, Holy Cross College; J.D.
1967, New York University; L.L.M. 1972, Harvard.
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2. E.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9-36 (1982).
3. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS. AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
4. I hasten to add that I use "liberal" in the sense outlined by Roberto Unger in his seminal work,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 76-77 (1975). The "liberal" mode of thought posits a radical distinction between
"facts." which are objective, and values, which are arbitrary and subjective. Since liberal consciousness
dominates (creates) our daily and intellectual lives, we are all (Ronald Reagan as well as Teddy Kennedy)
"liberals" in Unger's sense. See also A. MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981).
5. E.g., M. PERRY. supra note 3, at 29.
6. Id. at 28-29.
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enforcing those values that the framers designated and invalidating only those
political practices that the framers intended to ban or that are analogues of
such practices. 7 This interpretivist model claims the virtue of objectivity since
it allegedly precludes contemporary judges from infusing their own subjective
value preferences into the constitutional text. One of its weaknesses" is that,
if applied, it would eviscerate much well-entrenched constitutional doctrine;
not only would controversial decisions like the abortion cases9 disappear, but
decisions like Brown v. Board of Education'0 and most decisions protecting
the rights of free speech also would fall. " Since nobody wants to abolish free
speech rights against the states, interpretivists like Bork have been tempted to
stretch the theory to allow for free speech rights.' 2 Perry, however, easily
refutes Bork's attempts to save Brown and the free speech cases from the
clear implications of Bork's own theory.'3 A theory of judicial review that
legitimizes de jure segregation and is unable to recognize free speech rights
against the states has a short life expectancy.
While the conservative liberals strive to undermine most decisions of the
Warren era, the progressive liberals seek to legitimate those same activist
ventures in furtherance of progressive values. The most publicized recent
attempt at such legitimation has been John Hart Ely's Democracy and Dis-
trust. 14 Ely attempts to justify activist judicial review as a complement to the
majoritarian process, but he fails to explain where the constitutional text, its
history, or its structure authorizes the Court to perform this (in Ely's phrase)
"representation reinforcing" function.' 5 For this reason Ely's theory has
been easily debunked not only by conservatives but also by critical scholars '6
and other progressive liberals. 7 Working within the liberal paradigm, which
posits a basic distinction between constitutional text as fact and the judge's
7. Id. at 32.
8. Professor Perry finds interpretivism a very "forceful" theory, id. at 30, although he ultimately rejects
it, id. at 91. I predict that Perry will regret that flattering characterization and that soon the "interpretivist"
model of judicial review, like its intellectual cousin, the "economic analysis of law," will be of interest only as
illustrative of the ideological assumptions of its proponents. Certainly, it has many internal difficulties as a
theory. Who are the "framers"? Did the framers have any unitary "intent"? How do we determine (construct)
this intent? How do we decide when a modern practice is an "analogue" of a specifically banned practice? See
generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Dworkin,
The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981).
9. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. It is now generally accepted that the framers of the first amendment "intended" very few restrictions
on government regulation of speech (see L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960)) and the framers of the
fourteenth amendment, none at all (see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977)).
12. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
13. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 65--69.
14. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
15. See M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 77-90.
16. E.g., Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
17. E.g., Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063
(1980).
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activist interpretation as subjective value, a progressive liberal like Ely
inevitably is trapped by his own theoretical assumptions.
The critical writers reject both liberal positions. They are best known for
two types of claims. First, they contend that the area of indeterminacy in
constitutional adjudication is so great as to rob it of any claim to objectivity.' 8
It is ironic that this stand implicitly reinforces the conservative attack on the
legitimacy of the Warren Court's activism.' 9 Second, critical writers argue
that constitutional law does not just mask brute power; it acts as a tool that
the powerful in society wield to legitimate their privilege. E0
Traditional constitutional scholarship owes much more to the critical
school than it has yet been willing to acknowledge. In demonstrating the
malleability of key constitutional concepts and pointing out the ideological
assumptions behind allegedly neutral constitutional methodology, the critical
writers have performed an invaluable service. The critical thesis, however, is
unsatisfying in several ways. First, the argument about indeterminacy is
painted with too broad a brush. Granted, a clearly determinable "right"
answer is not present in every "hard" constitutional case (especially at the
Supreme Court level where stare decisis is a less rigorous restraint), but one
need not conclude that a "right" answer never exists. The truth is somewhere
in between; the binding power of precedent is sufficient to justify judicial
review in human rights cases, especially since no other effective method of
protecting individual rights from majoritarian incursion exists. 2, Second, the
critical position tends to slide towards a moral nihilism that is in tension with
its own egalitarian political program.2 Third, the critical writers appear un-
able to distinguish between the conservative and progressive liberal positions;
a principal critical pastime has been "trashing" ' progressive liberals like
Ely, Laurence Tribe, and Ronald Dworkin.24 Whatever the limitations of
Laurence Tribe as a social thinker, his political vision stands in dramatic
contrast to that of Robert Bork, and a truly "critical" theory should be able to
appreciate the differences. Last, critical theory blinds itself to the utopian
aspiration central to law, especially constitutional law. Constitutional law
18. E.g., Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in
the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1979). "[Both experience and the cases provide us with law that is
manipulable and fragmented to the point of anarchy." Id. at 1322.
19. It is interesting to note that, while rejecting "'liberalism," writers like Tushnet assume the validity of the
liberal paradigm in their discussion ofjudicial review. Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (1981).
20. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review
of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (1978).
21. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Denvir, Professor Dworkin and an
Activist Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 45 ALB. L. REV. 13 (1980).
22. Tushnet acknowledges the tilt towards nihilism and attempts to outline a "post-nihilist" Marxist
alternative, but one he offers "with a great deal of skepticism and some sheer hope." Tushnet, Truth, Justice,
and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307,
1309 (1979).
23. E.g., Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229 (1981).
24. See, e.g., Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1980).
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obviously reflects social power, but it also tempers and transforms that power
in an attempt to show itself to be something more-a search for justice. We
may enjoy only "advanced capitalist" human rights in the United States, but
those rights are not negligible and the courts are the forum in which they have
been won.5
Michael Perry's book provides a theoretical bridge between the progres-
sive liberal and critical positions by transcending the fact-value distinction
that has paralyzed all liberal scholarship. This breakthrough announces a new
era in constitutional jurisprudence.
Perry's connection with the progressive liberal tradition is most obvious;
his past writings reflect moderate left political values26 and he employs the
dispassionate style of analysis favored by traditional academics. Yet Perry's
intellectual honesty forces him to reject the liberal claim that constitutional
adjudication can be a science in which courts discover meanings that inhere
inertly in the constitutional text. He describes the Supreme Court's role as
"prophetic" and argues that judicial review plays "an important, even in-
dispensable function" in American politics just because it goes beyond
"facts" such as text and history into the realm of values. 7 American political
culture has never seen politics as only the calculation of the selfish pref-
erences of a temporary majority of voters; it also has viewed itself as a moral
enterprise committed "to an ever-deepening moral understanding., 28 Perry
argues that it is the role of the Supreme Court to deal with the "fundamental
political-moral problems" that this enterprise-"the search for justice" 29-
produces. In this secular sense the Supreme Court acts as a prophet calling on
an evolving inchoate social vision, and judicial review "represents the institu-
tionalization of prophecy."- 30 It is a role that the more democratically ac-
countable departments of government are not suited to perform, just because
they are so sensitive to transient majorities.
I suspect that Perry will be subjected to some ridicule because of his use
of religious imagery, 31 even though he stresses that his use of "religious"
refers only to a social "binding vision" and should not be understood in any
theistic sense.32 Yet because terms like "prophecy" make clear that he is
operating outside the fact-value dichotomy of liberal discourse, he should be
applauded.
25. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); see also E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 258-69
(1975); Denvir. Towards a Political Theory of Public Interest Litigation, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1133 (1976).
26. See, e.g., Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
540 (1977).
27. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 99, 101.
28. Id. at 101.
29. Id. at 101, 106.
30. Id. at 101.
31. See, e.g., Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 417 (1981).
Sager has commented that Perry "would ... have the Court hurl bolts of moral prophecy." Id. at 420 n.6.
32. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 97.
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At a functional level Perry's views on judicial review are close to those of
sophisticated progressive liberal thinkers like Ronald Dworkin and Owen
Fiss.33 Fiss, for instance, argues that constitutional interpretation is "neither
a wholly discretionary nor a wholly mechanical activity," but rather a
"dynamic interaction between reader and text, and meaning the product of
that interaction." 3 4 Both Fiss and Dworkin, however, attempt to force their
analyses to fit within the liberal paradigm,35 while Perry's analysis forthrightly
asserts that judicial review is sometimes more akin to contemplating a
mystery than solving a puzzle.36 He recognizes that the Supreme Court is an
institution whose morality is "'open,' not 'closed'-an institution that
... [looks] ahead to emergent principles in terms of which fragments of a
new moral order can be forged." 
37
Perry's move beyond the liberal paradigm brings him closer to the critical
position. For example, he implicitly accepts the critical position that some
indeterminacy is present in constitutional law; prophecy is not an exact
science. 38 Also, Perry, like the critical school, has no-patience with the claim
that constitutional law can be apolitical; he sees constitutional law as an
indispensable element of politics. 39 Perry's characterization of constitutional
law is strikingly parallel to that of critical writer Richard Parker. Parker
states: "[W]e must work, too, from a vision of a possible perfection of a
political life. In this sense 'vision' connotes a hypothesizing, or prescriptive
depiction, of a political life better than we know, a political life to which we
aspire.", 40 Perry calls constitutional law "an ongoing struggle to bring our
collective (political) practice into ever closer harmony with our evolving,
deepening moral understanding. '
41
Certainly, Parker's and Perry's positions are not identical. The contexts
of the two statements show that while Perry is relatively optimistic about the
possibility of bringing the reality into accommodation with the vision, Parker
believes that the ideal is used mostly as a mirage to legitimize the unsavory
reality. Yet the two are both speaking outside the liberal paradigm in terms
comprehensible to each other.
More important, the proponent of each position can learn from the other.
Critical writing would offer a more comprehensive view of law if it included
33. See Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpreta-
tion, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
34. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 739 (1982).
35. Fiss' recent article is entitled "Objectivity and Interpretation." See supra note 34. Dworkin has spent
much time showing that there is (almost always) "one right answer" to constitutional issues. R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 13 (1977).
36. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 98-99.
37. Id. at 111.
38. Id. at 109-11.
39. Id. at 101.
40. R. Parker, A Call for a New Jurisprudence of Constitutional Law 81-82 (1981) (unpublished manu-
script).
41. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 99.
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the utopian element present in Perry's work. Perry's analysis would be
deepened if he reexamined his unquestioning acceptance of the legitimacy of
the majoritarian process. Perry accepts the moral legitimacy of the major-
itarian process as "axiomatic" and does not attempt to justify it except on
pragmatic grounds: "[A]ny constitutional theory predicated on a rejection of
the principle of electorally accountable policymaking is destined to have little
currency .... 42 Passive acceptance cannot give the majoritarian process
moral legitimacy. Parker has demonstrated how this axiom ignores the
economic inequality that tilts the results of the majoritarian process towards
the interests of those with the money, time, and skill to play the game.43
A cross-breeding of these two traditions could result in a constitutional
theory quite distinct from and superior to the traditional writings on judicial
review, a theory that could make a persuasive rejoinder to Justice Holmes'
skepticism. The new constitutional interpretation would view law as a norma-
tive system that transcends the liberal distinction between fact and value.
While it would concede that interpretation always results in meaning being
produced by an interaction of reader and text, a judge still would be con-
strained by the duties of his or her craft. A judge is required to conform to
what Ronald Dworkin calls the "internal ideal" of law,44 including the duty to
state facts honestly and to treat like cases alike. In certain hard cases, how-
ever, especially at the Supreme Court level, constitutidnal interpretation re-
quires a judge to give meaning to, as well as take it from, the text. In such an
interpretation a judge, in pursuit of an ideal of justice, 45 must rely on inter-
subjective meanings outside the text, which "embody a certain self-defini-
tion, a vision of the agent and his community which is that of the society or
community.", 46 Clifford Geertz terms these visions ideologies. He stresses
that there is no pejorative connotation in his use of the term; 47 we can no more
stop conceiving of life in terms of ideologies than stop speaking prose. In a
class-divided society like our own, different life experiences create and are
refracted through different ideologies; different constitutional "meanings"
present themselves, each having some support in legal materials. For in-
stance, it should not be surprising that the Supreme Court reflects American
society's confusion on the issue of the justness of affirmative action. Constitu-
tional adjudication to some extent must be a debate between conflicting
visions, and constitutional scholars have to evaluate the Supreme Court's
product in terms of political morality as well as technical elegance. Accep-
42. Id. at 9.
43. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-and Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 242-43 (1931). It
appears to be Perry's acceptance of this axiom that leads him to endorse the power of the Congress to limit the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in some human rights cases. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 128-45.
44. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 187 (1982).
45. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 101-06; see also Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970
(1981).
46. Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, 25 REV. METAPHYSICS 3, 45 (1971).
47. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 218 (1973).
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tance by the court should never shield a principle from critical scrutiny. In
law, as elsewhere, we must beware of false prophets. 8
In many ways the concrete results generated by a theory of judicial
review like Perry's would not differ greatly from present constitutional prac-
tice. The idea that judges are influenced by politics is hardly novel. So, too,
the new theory leaves an important role for precedent. 49 Yet it would bring at
least two welcome changes. For instance, one result would be a gain in
candor. Justices would feel less pressure to torture history to discover the
proper (i.e., preferred) original "intent"; conservatives would be forced to
admit that their "strict construction" is no less political than their liberal
colleagues' activism. More important, judges, lawyers, and citizens would be
encouraged to think of constitutional law as a continuing moral enterprise in
which power must always answer to the claims of justice.
48. See Denvir, Justice Rehnquist and Constitutional Interpretation, - HASTINGS L.J. - (1983).
49. See generally Denvir, Professor Dworldn and an Activist Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 45
ALB. L. REV. 13 (1980).
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